aims to show that, in a model without inflationary bias, an increase in the degree of multiplicative uncertainty on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy improves social welfare when central bank's preferences are highly uncertain. We demonstrate that this result applies only to the case in which society is strictly conservative, i.e., when the weight attached to output in the social welfare function is lower than one.
Revisiting the role of multiplicative uncertainty in a model without inflationary bias
Introduction
In a recent contribution, Kobayashi (2003) sets out to show that, in a model without inflationary bias, an increase in multiplicative uncertainty in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy improves social welfare if the degree of central bank (CB) "opacity" is high enough, i.e., if the weights attached to its objective function are sufficiently uncertain. We show that this result holds only in a specific case, i.e., when society is "conservative" and provide an explanation for this result. Kobayashi's (2003) model (in logs) is made up by a private sector forming rational expectations on inflation and a CB setting the money supply in order to minimise the loss function: Aggregate supply is given by a Lucas "surprise" function, with the natural rate of output normalized to zero:
Kobayashi's (2003) model
where e π is expected inflation, and ε is a supply shock with zero mean, E[ε] = 0, and constant variance 2 ε σ . By setting the money growth rate, m, the CB can imperfectly control inflation, due to multiplicative uncertainty in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy:
where v is a random variable with E(v) = 0 and constant variance 2 v σ ; α, v and ε are independently distributed.
2
The game is solved by employing a standard backward procedure, so that minimisation of (1) subject to (2) and (3) gives the CB's reaction function: 2 The presence of α raises the question of how rational agents should behave and form their expectations in repeated games, conditional on having information on λ, which is a behavioural -thus known -parameter. In the literature on CB transparency it is generally assumed that it is difficult for the private sector to disentangle the effects of preference uncertainty and other random shock (e.g., ε and v), so that also in a repeated game setting the hypothesis on the probability distribution of λ can be maintained (see, e.g., the discussion in Muscatelli 1998) . 3 The timing of the game is as follows: (i) the private sector forms rational expectations; (ii) the supply shock ε occurs; (iii) α is revealed only to the CB; (iv) the CB chooses m; (iv) v materializes, and inflation and output are obtained. . If opacity is high enough, the effect of the increase in multiplicative uncertainty on the variance of inflation will dominate that on the variance of output, and Brainard (1967) conservatism principle, in the face of multiplicative uncertainty, allows to improve social welfare.
Revisiting Kobayashi's (2003) result
Is it possible that the condition 2 2 α σ λ < may hold without constraints? In this section we show that, in general, it is necessary to pose some bound on the magnitude of opacity 2 α σ .
As α must take values in a compact set, it is necessary to assess the behaviour of the variance of a random variable subject to the qualifications:
and E(α) = 0. The general problem of characterizing the moments of a random variable subject to specific constraints (e.g., to take values in a compact set) is a well-known issue in mathematical statistics (see, e.g., Kemperman 1968) and, without entering the general geometric approach that can be employed to solve this problem, the following sketchy argument may be sufficient for our purpose (Ciccarone, Di Bartolomeo and Marchetti, 2007) . The probability distribution of α ensuring the highest variance is the one that assigns positive probability values only to the extrema of α (-1 and λ) and zero elsewhere:
The distribution p is subject to the following constraint on the expected value:
. We can thus set the problem of finding the distribution p which maximises the variance of α:
( ) ( ) 
Discussion
Given the variance of the output shock, the variance of inflation Private agents always set π e = 0, thus never compensating the output shock, even when they face greater uncertainty when forecasting the CB's behaviour; thus the greater source of uncertainty associated with α leads them to make greater ex-post inflation forecast errors.
A more populist CB tries to "translate" the effect of the output shock more on the variability of inflation, but this does not guarantee that the volatility of output decreases (the more so the higher is opacity). This kind of behaviour is contrasted by Brainard's conservatism principle, which leads the CB to be more prudent in the use of its instrument m: the variability of inflation falls, as the CB is less inclined to react to the supply shock by changing the value of the monetary instrument.
If the economy is in the optimal social point, π = 0 and y = 0, and a negative shock ε (which produces an expansionary effect on y) occurs, the CB observes the shock ε and reacts by decreasing . The problem is hence that, with 1 > λ , the statistical bound on 2 α σ prevents this form of uncertainty from spreading in a sufficient manner its positive influence on expected welfare, something that can instead happen when the weight attached by society to output variability is lower than one.
Conclusion
We have shown that for Kobayashi's (2003) result to hold society (as well the CB "on average") must be conservative, i.e., in the social welfare loss it must attach to output a weight (λ) lower than one. From the technical point of view, this is due to the fact that there exists a maximum value for opacity, which can never be greater than λ. This constraint prevents an increase in multiplicative uncertainty from lowering "enough" the variability of output. From the economic point of view, the increase in multiplicative uncertainty makes the CB more prudent and inflation variability falls. The greater is opacity the sharper is this effect and the lower is the associate increase in output variability (which depends also on inflation variability). Both effects have favourable consequences on expected social welfare, but when society is populist the statistical bound on opacity prevents it from spreading in a sufficient manner its positive influence on expected welfare, something that can instead happen when λ is lower than one: when multiplicative uncertainty increases, greater opacity can be beneficial to society only when the CB is expected to be conservative. Antonio Pedone Enrico Saltari Annamaria Simonazzi I Working Paper vengono pubblicati per favorire la tempestiva divulgazione, in forma provvisoria o definitiva, dei risultati delle ricerche sulla teoria e la politica economica. La pubblicazione dei lavori è soggetta all'approvazione del Comitato Scientifico, sentito il parere di un referee.
